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1. Introduction 
 
 The perplexity which has arisen from the first performance of Beckett's Waiting for 
Godot is still very much present among the public. The rest of his plays succeeded to produce 
the same bafflement over the years and nothing concrete seems to have been concluded 
regarding their meaning. A statement which has, by now, been thoroughly ingrained in 
people's minds concerning the plays, is the fact that they avoid meaning. However, if they do 
avoid meaning and are truly devoid of it, then what is the purpose of their existence in the 
first place? This is a question which seems to be, oddly enough, the answer to all our 
dilemmas. It is the ultimate question of all of Beckett's stage presences and the plays 
themselves. It is both the problem and the solution, thoroughly self-enclosed and self-
referential, whose echo reverberates through the void of each performance. Behind the banal 
and pointless actions of the characters, we sense a deep feeling of emptiness and the pain of 
the awareness of it, that sneaks up on us from inside the mundane repetitiveness of life. This 
paper is primarily interested in the mechanism behind these manifestations and in the ways in 
which Beckett manages to create drama that concerns people across the board, but is, 
simultaneously, extremely private. For these purposes, I will be looking for examples from his 
most famous tragicomedy Waiting for Godot, along with Endgame, Happy Days, and Not I. 
One of the most important aspects of Beckett's plays is their self-referentiality, so this will be 
given special emphasis. But apart from this, the most striking aspect of the plays is the way in 
which they manage to say so much without really saying anything. In other words, the 
rhetorical feats the characters engage in and the skill with which they employ speech is 
remarkable in the sense that it gives them life, but, in the process, it constantly keeps 
reaffirming the nullity of their existence. 
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2. Self-referential drama  
 
Trying to extract from a Beckett play some sort of meaning pertaining to social 
problems and upheavals or trying to take away from it some philosophical truth or religious 
preference, always proves to be an impossible and utterly futile task. The characters seem to 
go to great lengths to know, to conclude with certainty, to complete and to adjust. They fail 
every time. The only thing that they themselves are sure of is their presence on stage and 
throughout the performance they constantly affirm and reaffirm that truth and only that. As 
conscious thought of the spectator tries to pick up on some sort of message that the seemingly 
allegorical performance exhorts, it is led to a dead-end road that points back to the 
performance itself. Taking from Cartesian thought the inability to express or reflect on 
anything other than our own current state, Beckett conveys this state through itself and not by 
way of some other experience. That way the referential link of meaning-making is thoroughly 
self-enclosed and self-referential. The meaning and purpose of the characters, therefore, 
cannot be affirmed by anything or any one outside their current state of being. This 
representation of solipsism reaffirming the impossibility of meaning or knowing can only 
reinforce that same impossibility. As Hassan says: ''Language has become void; therefore 
words can only demonstrate their emptiness. Certainty in knowledge is no longer possible; 
therefore epistemology must become parody.'' (30). It is the idea of universal epistemological 
uncertainty that Beckett was trying to highlight. However, the task was not to be executed by 
means of a character referring explicitly to the idea, nor by metaphorical insinuations or 
hidden meaning. Rather than trying to convey or interpret the idea, Beckett has incarnated it 
on stage. The theatrical techniques that he employs are not meant to point the meaning of the 
components of the play in the direction of reality. Actually, they deny the existence of that 
reality and, consequently, any meaning that could come from it, giving the very performance 
a solely solipsistic perspective. Therefore, as Levy points out, the plays ''are not ''about 
something'' – they are that something itself. Because they are their own subject matter the 
plays turn the means of their expresiveness into the very content of expression.'' (25). 
Stressing the theatricality of the theatrical performance, Beckett avoids telling and goes 
straight to showing, so that a certain play is the very process of the play. Because no meaning 
or purpose can be recognized in existence, the only thing the ''I'' can confirm and forever keep 
confirming is its state of being here and now. The self-reference of the ''I'' has no further 
agenda than to embody the futility of trying to express and the inability to confirm one's own 
existence. This relentless but pointless act of self-consciousness is, primarily, staged in the 
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author, so it must be seen in the characters as well, because they are the carriers of this 
experience, and in the shape of the play. Furthermore, the observer must also be made to 
experience this, because he cannot find meaning in a play that has none, but experience the 
structure of it by using his own inner faculties to feel the same futility and lack of purpose of 
his own consciousness. The observer is made to observe the very thing that he is doing at the 
moment, not to give meaning to what he is observing on stage. The plays are structured in a 
way that they, paradoxically, develop through entropy. Also, we see the characters acting as 
self-referential elements as they constantly comment on the performance itself. For example, 
in Act I of Waiting for Godot, right after Pozzo apologizes for his sudden and desperate fit, 
Gogo and Didi stand together next to the rock and whisper comments about the act itself. 
They reflect upon the strange and tiresome evening they are having and how it has only just 
started. The implications of the comment seem to extend farther from the fictitious character 
of the situation on stage. It sounds like something someone from the audience might have said 
or thought at that moment, and then we inevitably do think that because of the way the idea 
was presented and handed to us. The effect that is achieved is heightened awareness of the 
very act of observing a theatrical performance. Another example of this technique can be seen 
in Lucky's behaviour. He performs innumerable pointless actions, busy even when standing 
still. Gogo and Didi are puzzled as to why Lucky does not put down his bags even when his 
services are not needed. But Lucky is the embodiment of the idea of his character – he is 
primarily a slave, a thing, and he is showing us explicitly what a thing like him does, and he 
does this only and exclusively because he is what he is. His actions are redundant and purely 
theatrical. He sets the chair for Pozzo, and when he is commanded to readjust it, he does not 
move it but picks it up and puts it right back where it was, which seems to please Pozzo. 
Every action he takes is further enhanced by itself because it is the epitome of a slave, just 
like Pozzo is the archetypal cruel master. Lucky does not think but is commanded to think, he 
does not move unless he is told to move, and the observer is made to be highly aware of this. 
Pozzo must first verbally direct Lucky's every step and then, in the same way, order him to 
stop when he has removed himself far enough for Pozzo's liking. If he were not commanded 
to stop, he would probably just walk off stage. Using these mechanisms, Beckett makes us 
highly aware of the expressiveness of an act which can then, in turn, be only truly experienced 
through our own ''I''. The enclosed character of the plays, with its complete attention turned to 
itself, is actually reinforcing the experience to be felt in the observer's own ''I'', rather than 
pushing him away. It is the only way that a performance can be truly internalized – if we are 
transparently shown the process of the performance:  
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         The indubitability of the Cogito, the ''I express'' (for Beckett is an artist, not a 
philosopher ) is due to the thought act each man has to ''perform himself'' after 
having witnessed such an act being performed by an actor. (Levy, 17). 
Beckett's characters are always aware of their situation, namely, that they are actors on stage 
and have a task to perform. This is the reason why, although they do have certain moments of 
what looks like desperation, they do not pity themselves or go into sentimental, melancholic 
rants about their situation. They accept it and they know that as long as they are in existence it 
is and can only be on the stage. Therefore, any self-reflective utterance that seems to come 
from a deep place of knowing one's own existence and strongly affirming it is, as we come to 
realize, just good acting. It is not, as Shimon Levy explains, proof of existence, but of the 
awareness of its performatory character: 
Thus, Beckett's implied or explicit self-reflective sentences (emotionally charged 
self-reflective utterances such as I cry, I suffer, etc. – ergo I am; or medium-aware 
utterances such as I speak on radio – ergo I am; or I mime  - ergo I am) are also of 
performatory quality rather than proofs, or inferences, of existence. They are 
merely attempts at showing the nonsensicality of the very attempt at proving 
existence. (Levy, 17).  
  Self-referential qualities appear on every level of Beckett's plays. Being that the 
characters exclude the possibility of an existence outside the play, they demand attention from 
one another to reassure themselves they are there. In Waiting for Godot Gogo and Didi 
depend on each other just as much as Lucky and Pozzo do. When Didi goes to urinate, Gogo 
compensates for his absence and theatrically mimics the act of urination. Toward the end of 
Act II, Gogo stands up and groans because his feet hurt. But when Didi does not respond, he 
repeats the groan emphatically to make sure he was heard. In Happy Days, Winnie also 
always needs Willie to justify her act of speech. As soon as she jolts out of him the slightest 
word of recognition with her occasional questions and remarks, she is safe and reassured to go 
on. The whole play is set in this self-referential mode as Winnie, at the beginning, must 
verbally push herself: ''Begin, Winnie. (Pause.) Begin your day, Winnie.'' (10). If Gogo and 
Didi separate only for a few seconds, they come back running into each other's arms and hold 
on tight. We see that they have a self only through the other. This self-reference works 
primarily thanks to the other of the actor: ''Only if the actors refer their Beckettian texts to 
themselves, and not only to their roles, does the play really ''work'', at least as far as the self-
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referential aspects are concerned.'' (Levy, 62). The characters, therefore, must show that they 
are in an artificial situation and the actors, paradoxically, reaffirm the truth of the artificiality 
of the performance. In Endgame we see an example of the actor playing Clov seemingly 
stepping out of character, which focuses our attention on the artificial existence of Clov, on 
his being through the other. Levy explains that his 
costume change refers directly to his role as actor. It is as though Clov had 
finished his role and returned as the actor playing Clov, reading to leave the 
theatre but politely waiting for the actor playing Hamm to finish his role. (52).  
Beckett also uses light in a way that it refers back to itself. It draws attention to itself because 
it does not merely serve the purpose of lighting up the stage, but is used to enhance the 
situation that is already playing out, to focus the attention of the audience if necessary, and it 
also, as Levy says, ''is either darker or brighter than one finds in conventional theatre.'' (40). In 
Waiting for Godot and Endgame, light is scarce and dim, creating a gloomy atmosphere that 
reinforces the feeling of the pain that comes with endless waiting and being. In contrast, 
Happy Days is a play meant to have violent, scorching light, but the effect of the affliction of 
endurance is the same. The use of light is particularly interesting in Not I. The single beam of 
light furthers the point that the only speaking character on the stage is not a woman but a 
mouth. It also makes the performance more intense and adds to the tempo of the speech. The 
observer is forced to focus only on the mouth and its unrelenting rhetorical attack, and this is 
so because of the single fact that he cannot see anything else. If theatre is to be self-
referential, it must over-emphasize its basic elements. This is exactly what is achieved in the 
case of Beckett. Theatrical elements are blown out of proportion to the point of either being 
comical or concealing a tragic fate. But no true meaning lies behind these oversized gestures. 
They make their own point. It is also the case with movement. As has already been 
mentioned, Lucky is made to repeat endless adjustments and readjustments to the props he is 
carrying, even though his efforts do not make any difference. Anything that Gogo and Didi do 
to pass the time, they do with absolute physical and mental dedication in a slapstick-like 
manner. Winnie's lower body is buried in the ground, but she still repeatedly makes use of all 
of her props, utilizing fully every body part she can. As Alec Reid points out, ''Movement as 
much as speech is one of the essentials of drama, and so Beckett keeps his people busy.'' (24). 
 
 
8 
 
2.1. Paradox 
 
 In the sense of the contradictions of Beckett's plays such as attempting to express – not 
being able to express – performing the very inability to express, Shimon Levy points out two 
interlinked paradoxes that function as self-negating, but at the same time act as a dominant 
theme:  
(1) the paradox of expression (''there is nothing to express''), and (2) the very 
attempt at expressing paradox. Beckett's self-consciousness uses both, and does so 
not only in order to prove two members of a contradiction to be mutually 
exclusive and logically incongruous, but also in order to indicate that the very use 
of a self-reflective paradox is in itself paradoxical and reflexive. (21). 
It is a theatrical performance talking about and reflecting on that very same theatrical 
performance, which stresses its fictional character thereby ''denunciated through its own 
means, but finally, and paradoxically, becomes real through the process of the audience's 
active participation.'' (21). In other words, we have no choice but to internalize it and realize 
the emptiness of our own self, by mirroring the unavoidable emptiness and nothingness of the 
performance. We are being pushed to hold in our own awareness the awareness of the play of 
its own paradoxical nature. Finally, it is the paradox of the whole situation that is being 
conveyed and translated into us. The paradox also shows up through the comical element. In 
their stalemate position, Didi and Gogo talk about hanging themselves as if it was the most 
normal topic of conversation two people might have. They eventually give it up and decide to 
keep on waiting. Their situation could not be more vague or uncertain, and when Didi says 
''Let's wait till we know exactly how we stand.'' (18), we sense that the prospect of that 
happening is very unlikely. Didi stresses the word 'exactly', while they perform a sort of 
slapstick routine, marching hand in hand, as if towards a brighter future. But there is nothing 
exact about it, and we find them sad and amusing at the same time. They are totally involved 
in anything they are doing, and absolutely dedicated, which seems ridiculous because their 
actions are absurd and pointless. The tramps are doing as instructed and are made to make 
that point clear. Their own will is irrelevant and their only task is to perform. ''The sheer 
energy which the tramps invest in constructing a context is one of the factors which prevents 
them from looking within, from ''having thought'', from becoming themselves.'' (Kiberd, 543).  
Gogo watches with great excitement and wonder as Didi reaches in his jacket pocket for a 
carrot. Neither of them comment on the fact that the carrot is the size of a sewing needle with 
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disproportionately large leaves. Gogo starts munching on it, taking very small bites. The 
comical element is backed up by their brief exchange: 
VLADIMIR: How's the carrot? 
ESTRAGON: It's a carrot. (20). 
 In Happy Days the fact that Winnie is buried to her waist acts as a contradiction to her 
friskiness and energy. She does not dig herself out because she cannot, she keeps talking 
because she must and she must because she is an actress on a stage. She has agreed to play the 
role and in that case she has no choice but to do as instructed. Winnie, as most of the other 
characters, makes her awareness of this quite clear. The people on stage usually refer to the 
condition they are in, the circumstances of here and now, and the exclusiveness of their 
reality as they are living it in order for the performance to be in existence. The tramps never 
question the inevitability of them being on stage. Although they do, at one point, discuss the 
possibility of them leaving this whole business of waiting, they know they cannot and never 
will, even when flirting with the idea. Didi seems sure in what the outcome would be if they 
stopped waiting: 
ESTRAGON: And if we dropped him? (Pause.) If we dropped him. 
VLADIMIR: He'd punish us. (93) 
 
2.2. Circularity and repetition 
 
 Because Beckett's stage contains a limited number of props, they can be used 
repeatedly in the same way so that the audience can recognize a certain gesture when it 
happens again. That way a general sense of circular movement is achieved and we recognize 
it as a common thread running through the whole play. Repetition also helps to build up the 
intensity of the recurring elements, in order to attract attention to themselves and, 
consequently, point right back at the fact that nothing changes and that the tone of the play's 
ending is the same as that of the start or the middle. As David Bradby points out, ''Repetition 
emphasizes sameness, and the monotonous quality of the play is an important part of its 
effect.'' (37). At the beginning of Waiting for Godot, just after he tries to take off his shoe and 
fails, Gogo lifts his arms and then lowers them slowly, gesturing with his hands the shape of a 
circle. This first demonstration of the impossibility to act, paired with the circularity of 
referring back at the attempt to act and not being able to, is rounded off in a sentence: 
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''Nothing to be done.'' (9). We recognize the moment again, just before Pozzo and Lucky 
show up in Act I, when Gogo makes the same gesture. The tramps complement each other: 
ESTRAGON: No use struggling. 
VLADIMIR: One is what one is. 
ESTRAGON: No use wriggling. 
VLADIMIR: The essential doesn't change. 
ESTRAGON: Nothing to be done. (21). 
Levy emphasizes that the use of the props also tells us more about the relationships between 
the characters. For example, the rope in Waiting for Godot is ''the rope that ties them together, 
figuratively and literally. Pozzo and Lucky lead each other with the rope; Vladimir and 
Estragon are tied by a common pact to hang themselves together.'' (46). Also, in ''Act II, 
Pozzo uses Lucky as a blindman's dog, and the same rope becomes a sign of his dependency 
rather than his dominance.'' (46). A sense of a distortion of time is achieved. They can never 
agree on what day it is, nor what season. They use every hour they have in a relatively 
ingenious and playful way, but every time one activity looses its momentum, the question of 
what to do now arises once again. The nature of their existence seems to have attributions of 
dreams or unconscious thought, and the written text appears as an act of automatic writing. 
The conversations the characters engage in have no semantic connection to the ones that 
precede or succeed them and they alternate at a quick pace because of the short attention span 
of the characters. Lois Gordon tells us: ''Freud asserted that unconscious and dream thoughts 
contain a unique grammar and language dominated by condensation, displacement, paradox 
and distortions of time and space.'' (73). We can see all these characteristics as inherent to 
every level of the plays, especially condensation or reduction that is explicit in the use of 
language regarding its meaning. Every activity the characters undertake is, in its banality and 
superfluity, the same as the previous and the next. Despite their attempt to change or shake 
things up a bit, they keep moving around in circles. What is the use of putting your time to 
good use when the time you have is unending? The opposing, contradictory forces underline 
the paradox in time itself:  
One plays out one's life against a complex counterpoint of mechanical time (in 
which one ages and moves to death and obliteration), and cosmic time (in which 
one's acts have no function whatsoever. (Gordon, 67).  
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Because the same themes reappear, the same props are used again and again, they tie into a 
more general associative line of circularity and repetitiveness in movement and gesture, the 
difference between the context of day and night, oscillation of moods and topics of 
conversation, etc. When night turns to day, we get the sense that night might have actually 
lasted for several nights, a month or a season. When the tree sprouts new leaves it also seems 
to be over night, but we cannot be sure, and neither can Didi or Gogo. Beckett' people are 
always there, in a stable and incurable position, if the play is to keep unfolding. 
The phenomenon of the sense of infinitude was studied by Freud under the term 
repetition: it has no boundaries (or is purely repetitive), moving nowhere. [...] 'It's 
the shape that matters', said Beckett, who compensates artistically for the 
shapelessness of the universe, in order to preserve his sense of existence. 
(Duckworth, 62).  
Waiting for Godot begins as it ends and ends as it begins. It is purely repetitive throughout, 
and each element of itself is made to emphasize this. In the same way, Endgame leaps toward 
the end at the very beginning, as Clov's starts off with ''Finished, it's finished, nearly finished, 
it must be nearly finished.'' (12), and Hamm begins the same way he ends – with his old 
stancher. 
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3. An attempt to exist  
 
Looking more closely into how is the sense of circularity and repetition achieved in the 
plays through how and when something is said or used brings us closer to both contradictions 
and unifying elements that tie the characters together and it also tells us about the condition 
they are in. When we examine their surroundings, we usually find an arid landscape on a 
grand scale, and although they are physically a part of it, they seem to be enclosed in the 
mind. This is explicitly addressed in Endgame, where the characters' sanctuary has also the 
function of a prison of the mind. The vast void that stretches infinitely in all directions is 
contrasted with a small, restricted area inside which they are allowed to move, or, in the case 
of Nagg, Nell and Hamm, not even that. The idea behind it is to focus our attention on what is 
happening to the mind, how logic fails, and social niceties and moral issues become devoid of 
meaning in a different context.  Happy Days and Not I are even more extreme – taking even a 
single step is out of the question, so we have no choice but to listen to the mind play both with 
and against itself. This is the conflict of the self in a futile rhetorical outburst, trying to 
persuade itself it exists, but incapable of validating anything. It is the essential condition we 
are born to, that, as Lois Gordon says, ''necessitates inevitable loneliness and anxiety.'' (3). 
Comparing Beckett to existentialist thought, Gordon explains: 
The absence of a verifiable order or Orderer – with language, intellect, and reason 
incapable of validating reality – impels a psychic dislocation as much as an 
intellectual  bewilderment. In Beckett's terms, one feels one can't go on, yet one 
must go on. One requires purpose in a purposeless universe, identity in an 
estranged mind / body coupling. Of this, as well as of the intricate conflicts with 
the self, Beckett writes in Waiting for Godot, '' 'Let's go.' (They do not move.). (3). 
The characters' ''longing for release from consciousness is given dramatic expression.'' 
(Duckworth, 39). Their only existence is taking place on stage. It is the prison of being aware 
of one's own condition and knowing there is no way out. Gogo and Didi bluntly acknowledge 
this. Their own will is irrelevant. They exhibit an awareness that refers to their condition as 
actors that have agreed to embody presences on stage. Therefore, there is no force that has 
acted against them. They are the ones that have given up their rights: 
VLADIMIR: You'd make me laugh, if it wasn't prohibited. 
ESTRAGON: We've lost our rights? 
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VLADIMIR: We waived them. (19). 
They constantly oscillate between great interest in and fascination with a particular situation 
and pensive moods with occasional outbursts of desperation. They remember the emptiness, 
the eternity, the uselessness of it all, but then they distract themselves, use their bodies and 
voices, and persuade themselves they exist: ''We always find something, eh, Didi, to give us 
the impression that we exist?'' (69). When Pozzo and Lucky come back in Act II, they are 
lying on the floor, and Gogo and Didi start a discussion on whether they should help them or 
not. Didi then points to the importance of taking advantage of the diversion they have been 
offered: 
 Let us not waste our time in idle discourse! (Pause. Vehemently.) Let us do 
something, while we have the chance! It is not every day that we are needed. Not 
indeed that we personally are needed. (79). 
In other words, their only purpose is merely being present on stage. It is a fact from which 
there is no escape, except in the focusing of their attention on a distraction that might make 
them forget and make the hours a bit more bearable.  
  Alain Robbe-Grillet, in his essay ''Samuel Beckett, or ''Presence'' in the theatre'', 
writes: 
The condition of man, says Heidegger, is to be there. The theatre probably 
reproduces this situation more naturally than any of the other ways of representing 
reality. The essential thing about a character in a play is that he is ''on the scene'' : 
there. (108). 
That way the dramatic character confirms his existence through the actor, by ''not deceiving 
us, by appearing, by being there.'' (Duckworth, 47). However, the existence of the characters 
is inevitably linked to annihilation. Life is inescapably two things: life and death, a fact which 
certainly brings no resolution to the mind that is stuck somewhere in between. ''Heidegger 
stated the theme clearly: 'As soon as a man is born, he is old enough to die'.'' (75). From this 
perspective nothing is worth while, so the tramps do their best to forget and to replace the 
thought of eternal void by engaging in activities which give them a sense of purpose. They 
know they are condemned to eternal boredom, a thought that Didi, resolutely and consciously, 
wants to misplace: 
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We wait. We are bored. (He throws up his hand.) No, don't protest, we are bored 
to death, there's no denying it. Good. A diversion comes along and what do we 
do? We let it go to waste. Come, let's get to work! (81).  
The doubt and suspicion directed toward the existence of a benign deity provides 
further cause for anxiety and inconclusiveness. In this case the relationships between the 
characters represent this uncertainty as they cling to each other like small children to their 
parents. But their fragile state inevitably gives rise to more ambivalence. They torment and 
insult each other, only to be able to reconcile again. It is just another game for them, and it is 
intentionally presented as artificial and insincere. After they have finished offending each 
other, they enact a scene of reconciliation where they mechanically embrace and then 
immediately separate. Didi concludes: ''How time flies when one has fun!'' (76). This 
behaviour mirrors the paradoxical nature of the dramatic situation. As much as each 
individual character wants to proclaim his or her independence as a system that is self-
sufficient and real, he or she, at the same time, can never part from the presence of the other 
on stage in order for the system to function. The ''I'' of the character must split in order to 
exist. This is the same sort of relationship that is established between the play and the 
audience. Levy explains that such a development in modern theatre suggests the following: 
 Leave me alone. I (the particular character or an entire play) am perfectly self-
contained .'' Yet it is doing it in public, and hence, by its very mode of existence, 
implies: ''I need you, the other, the audience,'' in order to assert, as Gadamer says, 
the self-consciousness of the self through the self-consciousness of the other. (23).  
They must keep reaffirming their own existence with the help of the other. In Happy Days, 
Winnie seems to be totally self-consumed and focused on all her tasks, but she does, as John 
Pilling says, ''realize that Willie is the precondition for her speaking, and it is increasingly 
obvious that she only has an existence for herself in so far as she continues speaking.'' (86). 
Her rhetoric is then, as is with all the others, of a life-giving and life-affirming kind, as much 
as it, simultaneously, itself the proof of its own futility: 
All Beckett's characters are engaged in the awareness of the creative process, 
especially in words, so much so that talking for them becomes a metaphor for 
living, a substitute for living, and a mode of living in the Cartesian sense of ''I 
utter, ergo I am.'' They are aware of their verbal existence and they crave silence 
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so as to stop it all. But, and dialectically so, as long as they talk about wanting 
silence (death) they keep on living. (Levy, 135). 
They create the very process of the play by speaking and interacting, and this is where their 
perseverance comes to the foreground as a mechanism of doing rather than contemplating, of 
acting out as opposed to surrendering to self-pity. In that sense, Beckett's people represent all 
of humanity, determined to keep the illusion of being purposeful alive. The only thing that 
Gogo and Didi ever know for sure is that they must wait. Didi says in Act II: ''We're no longer 
alone, waiting for the night, waiting for Godot, waiting for ... waiting.'' (77). Everything else 
is either forgotten, or misplaced, or misunderstood. Their stage presence and the act of 
waiting is all they have and all there is. The plays as part of the Theatre of Absurd boldly 
point to the lack of meaning of anything a human hand or mind might reach for. The 
insignificance of any act is even more strongly emphasized through the comical elements of 
movement and speech the tramps engage in. Gogo and Didi, as already mentioned, 
deliberately abuse each other, but only to create some sort of illusion of contrast to the 
planned reconciliation that comes after cruelty. The tramps recognize their pitiful condition. 
However, they cannot hang themselves even if they had the proper props for it, so we see 
them as tragic. They prance around in their restricted area, they exercise or 'do the tree' and 
they are comical. The result is, as Hassan says, ''often a tragi-comedy of metaphysical errors 
and sprats, a crazy, shifting pattern of meaning disguised in nonsense, a quizzical statement 
on the absurd persistence of man.'' (175). The state they are in is teeming with endless 
epistemological uncertainty that makes the inner workings of the mind the focal point of 
everyone's attention, both on stage and off. The only thing they are not lacking are the 
questions. ''There's no lack of void'' (66), says Gogo. The act of asking a question is, 
simultaneously, one's birth, and life, and death, but no knowing ever comes from it.  
Cartesian certainties, which depend on the uniformity of the mental process and of 
mathematical analysis, now yield to universal doubts. And as metaphysical once 
yielded to the scientific method, so the latter must give way, Beckett believes, to 
epistemological enigmas. The starting point of meditation is no longer the 
Cartesian ''Je pense, done je suis,'' but rather, ''Je me doute''; and the point is 
quickly reached where the facts of inquiry dissolve into the reality of the inquirer, 
casting further doubt on both. (Hassan, 127).  
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Because of this, the characters are always mutually dependent. It seems as though the mind 
would collapse into itself in loneliness. It needs the reassurance of the other to keep 
functioning. From a dramatic standpoint, this is how the characters justify their existence. As 
previously mentioned, the actors fulfil their role just by being there, but it is the interplay of 
more than one consciousness that can truly translate the point to the observer and make him 
realize the dependence of interlocking minds through which he exists. Colin Duckworth 
explains that out of all the art forms, ''the theatre is the only one able to show us (not tell us) 
the essential part social role-playing has in acquiring and maintaining a sense of reality, 
through the establishment of relationships.'' (58). This ''sense of reality'' is the focal point in 
Beckett, and it is not meant to be the mimetic presentation of the self, but the inability of 
presentation of the self. The relationships we observe on stage are failed attempts at creating 
meaning because they are trying to be established through a medium that is meaningless. We 
are made to see that language has no substance and that that which is outside of it is equally 
indefinable, so a subject attains temporary meaning in relation to another, but even that is 
illusory. As Lawrence Harvey explains: ''Two, in a sense, cancel each other out and enable 
reality to disengage itself from language. '' (147).  
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4. Emphasizing emptiness 
 
 From Waiting for Godot on, Beckett's plays have exhibited a progressive annihilation 
of what is presented on stage. The stage was being deliberately stripped of props and the 
characters, the less they had, the more they clung to what they did have. The concept of the 
void was ever greater and threatened to engulf all of existence. However, this technique was 
also serving the purpose of narrowing our attention to emptiness itself and the barren stage 
made the desired effect of the feeling of emptiness more pronounced.  
Richard Coe has pointed out78 that Beckett and Ionesco have in common the 
fundamental proposition that at the root of consciousness and of all Being there is 
a Void – but a positive Void which is the starting-point for a new lucidity and 
awareness of meaninglessness. [...] It is achieved by the isolation of what is 
represented on the stage from the spectator's world. (Duckworth, 109).  
Since language was deemed incapable of contributing any meaning to existence, more 
emphasis was given to the way something is said or presented. Beckett attempted to create a 
sense of a stage that is all of time and place, all that there is in existence. Any superfluous 
props would distract the attention of the observer, and any statement or sentence left 
uncontradicted might lead us to a conclusion when there should be none. The danger lies in 
allowing us to define and specify that which is represented and so the opportunity to do so is 
eradicated. The result of an ''almost methodical lack of method'' (Levy, 17), is what Alec Reid 
called ''the drama of the non-specific'' (34). Beckett's use of symmetry allowed him to stretch 
the sense of repetition outside the stage itself and enhance the feeling of emptiness. He 
divides Waiting for Godot in Act I and II, but he does not do so in order to accentuate their 
difference, but to bring them closer together as segments that are equally redundant. The 
feeling of repetition and circularity is achieved, as previously mentioned, through the use of 
props and recurring themes, but, on a larger scale, Act II is also a mere extension of the 
redundancy of the first, an additional amplification of the lack of meaning. Therefore, as 
Francis Doherty points out, ''the second act shows a rapidity of deterioration already 
demonstrated as a fact in the first.'' (91). It is a paradoxical balance between the two, in the 
sense that the more material we are presented with, the less we can conclude, until we are 
finally left with nothing. There may have been endless acts before the two, and endless after 
them. ''The two acts, as Beckett knew, are enough to represent a sequence stretching to 
infinity.'' (Hassan, 176). Avoiding meaning can also be found in the use of pantomime. The 
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observer finds himself on an even less stable ground and is forced to turn inward in an attempt 
to fill the gap, because, as Levy says, ''the pantomimes deprive us of the relative security of 
words.'' (36). Reducing the use of light and props inevitably reduces the stage space and 
creates a sense of the offstage becoming more and invading the stage. It also makes us more 
aware of the offstage itself and how it interacts with what is on stage, so that the characters' 
consciousness seems to be more acutely tuned to non-being rather than being and presence. 
Since theatre deals with ''presences'' in time, in space and in actual three-
dimensional human beings who are really there, the feeling for the not there, not 
now, and not I  has always been very strong. The shadowy Doppelgänger of the 
thatre, offstage, has developed side by side with drama and theatre alike. (Levy, 
54).  
Beckett has succeeded in creating a strong sense of dominance of the offstage over the stage, 
simply by emphasizing the non-presence of it. Didi and Gogo rely on the instructions that are 
to come from off the stage, but the non-presence and the non-being cannot, by its very nature, 
offer any resolution. The boy that appears in Waiting for Godot seems to come as a messenger 
that could shed some light on the situation, but he only manages to bring the darkness of the 
offstage with him. His purpose is to further the condition of the tramps, not to bring any 
resolution to it. He comes from a world he does not know how to explain. He cannot say why 
he does not get beaten and why his brother does, he informs the tramps that Godot does 
nothing, and, when he comes back in the second act, he has no memory of yesterday. The 
awareness of the offstage that the boy brings with his very presence reinforces the nullity of 
the stage. Didi is very concerned with his own existence, but is not reassured and starts to 
doubt. He insists on the message being delivered properly: ''Tell him... (he hesitates)... tell 
him you saw me and that... (he hesitates) that you saw me.'' (92). He is very eager to get some 
sort of confirmation from the boy, he encourages him: ''You're sure you saw me, eh, you 
won't come and tell me tomorrow that you never saw me before?'' (92), but there is only 
silence. The fact that Godot never comes is exactly why Gogo and Didi stay put. They are 
disciplined by what is not there, confirming its non-being through the simple fact of them 
being on stage.  
Godot, by dramatic character and theatrical definition, is offstage. Not only does 
he exist there – he is the personification of offstage, rather than just being off this 
stage or another. (Levy, 117).  
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But through the invasion of this anti-space, the central theme of presence is even more 
strongly emphasized. The observer becomes acutely aware of the kind of heightened presence 
on stage, a dense and concentrated sort of being that demands to be looked at. In landscapes 
that have a post-apocalyptic feel to them, the characters seem to be the last people on earth. 
Their existence seems meaningless and spent and their actions useless and pathetic. However, 
they are also lively creatures that make an effort to entertain and be entertained, to insist on 
pretending that the choices they make are theirs. They are the epitome of all human kind, the 
best and the worst, the cruel and the compassionate, all specimens piled up together and all 
equal, sentenced to life. 
 Because life inevitably means death and void, and brings with it the absence of 
meaning and purpose, the people on stage snigger at it and even fear it. Life is only further 
procreation of emptiness and can only bring more pain. In Endgame, a flea is all it takes to 
cause anxiety in Hamm, and Clov takes the necessary measures to make sure it is eradicated: 
HAMM: [very perturbed] But humanity might start from there all over again! Catch him, 
  for the love of God! 
CLOV: I'll go and get the powder. (27). 
In Happy Days, Winnie is excited to see an emmet: ''Looks like life of some kind'' (23). But 
excitement about life turns into mocking it and laughing at its absurdity. A misunderstanding 
arises. 'Formication' immediately brings 'fornication' to mind, but their giggling is really 
addressed at life itself. Life is God's cruel joke precisely because it is exclusively self-
referential, and its purpose is just being. Winnie concludes: ''How can one better magnify the 
Almighty than by sniggering with him at his little jokes, particularly the poorer ones?'' (24). 
Winnie is actually happy to see everything just the way it is. She is surrounded with a barren 
wasteland that guarantees the inability of any new life showing up: ''What a blessing nothing 
grows, imagine if all this stuff were to start growing.'' (27). The threat of life, as an expression 
of the expansion of nothingness, increases through our attention to it. The kind of secondary 
existence that comes with the use of language and with trivial distractions finds ease in 
movement, however illusory, as opposed to silent contemplation of the suffering of being. 
Therefore, the very ability we have of being able to think, to contemplate our own condition, 
is the ultimate punishment. ''What is terrible is to have thought.'' (W, 64). Winnie makes a 
similar observation while holding up her parasol: ''Holding up wearies the arm. (Pause.) Not 
if one is going along. (Pause.) Only if one is at rest. (Pause.) That is a curious observation.'' 
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(28). In other words, the only way in which the characters can ease their condition is by 
diving into superficial thoughts and preoccupations in order to divert their attention. 
Unfortunately, the only way they can do that is by using the same faculties, that of the mind, 
which are responsible for their condition in the first place. Their attempt to exist in a 
meaningful way unavoidably comes hand in hand with the awareness that cannot they have 
meaning at all, and becomes part of the same impulse to crave death and destruction. These 
opposing forces create contradictions on all levels and keep the characters in an endless and 
closed loop. In Endgame, the possibility of meaning is laughable: 
CLOV: [Impatiently] What is it? 
HAMM: We're not beginning to ... to ... mean something? 
CLOV: Mean something! You and I, mean something! [Brief laugh.] Ah that's a good  
  one! (27). 
Jean-Jacques Mayoux tells us that, for Beckett, ''language was the symbol of all impositions 
of the social over the individual'' (34), and we can see how this idea is utilized, for example, 
in Lucky’s speech in order to dispense with the idea of meaning in language. Lucky’s 
thinking turns into a parody of thought  that emphasizes the emptiness of language used in 
intellectual circles by playing with its terms which, then, become empty words flung out of 
their usual context, distorted and forced into a proclamation of meaninglessness. Harvey 
explains: 
Lucky, when he begins to ''think'', not only deflates the intellectual but at the same 
time satirizes into non-existence our many specialized professional and 
avocational categories. The dignified anthropology becomes the comical 
anthropometrics and is further ridiculed by the stuttering repetition of the central 
syllable, Anthropopopometry. In a more general way, the modern institution of 
the Academy that awards prizes for excellence in the various fields becomes the 
Acacacacademy, which by implication dispenses caca (excrement in child 
language) for unfinished research .... '' (145-146). 
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5. Silence and sound 
 
 Beckett uses symmetry and repetition in order to put emphasis on the contrast that 
arises from the effect. However, the result of the contrasting is not to be the usual more 
pronounced understanding of a certain subject when it is placed alongside its opposite. What 
is achieved is a counter effect, meaning that both sides contributing to the contrast are 
presented as equally precarious and together they confirm each others inconclusiveness. The 
inability of language to communicate anything to anyone turns it into a joke, a game that 
confirms its own redundancy. Objects, just like words, are empty and remain silent. 
Beckett considers language a dead habit; his rhetoric cunningly demonstrates the 
point. Sentences end by denying the assertions with which they began. Questions 
receive further questions for an answer. Misunderstandings, contradictions, 
repetitions, and tautologies abound. The syntax is often the syntax of nonsense, 
the grammar of absurdity. And silence, literal silence, invades the interchanges 
between human beings. Beckett's style approaches the semantic neutrality of 
number. Ceaselessly, it performs combinations and permutations upon itself; 
ceaselessly, it attempts to purify itself from all reference. (Hassan, 206).  
As the characters try to confirm existence using rhetorical means, they find it to be equally 
silent as silence itself. There is nothing in existence that can be said to mean something, there 
is nothing to say or do, nothing to be silent about, nothing to be expressed without it being 
redundant. Beckett used these techniques by denying their purpose and meaning through 
themselves, to reach for a stillness and silence behind all these illusions, a silence that speaks 
using rhythm and emotion. 
Not I, for example, shocks us with a torrent of words that come gushing out of Mouth. But 
beyond the meaning of the text or individual words, we notice the repetition of elements, the 
rhythmical use of sounds and pauses, sudden arrests followed by sequences again building up 
momentum. These are the qualities of a composition that bring out the essentially theatrical 
component of Beckett's plays which must be seen and heard in order to be experienced. They 
also must be looked at as a whole because they are a structure that is more than the sum of its 
parts. Alec Reid points out: ''Beckett will speak of leading up to a pause and going away from 
it as others might of a rhetorical climax or even a physical action.'' (29).  
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The pauses and silences in Beckett's plays are as important as the sounds. For example, the 
meaninglessness of a phrase or a conversation might be amplified by a pause, and its 
absurdity prolonged by the silence that surrounds it. The coupling of silence and sound is 
another indication of the oscillations in consciousness that Beckett wanted to achieve. Silence 
is a representation of lack in general. It stresses the nothingness of existence and is used to 
magnify the feeling of it. It becomes a way of showing us what is not there, as well as 
augmenting the very fact that it is not. It is a mechanism of showing us the lack of meaning  
and the superfluity of language. In Waiting for Godot, Gogo and Didi demonstrate the fact 
that their existence depends on them using language, and that as long as they are on stage they 
must keep talking. In Act II, Gogo suggests that they ''try and converse calmly, since we're 
incapable of keeping silent.'' (62). They start talking about the dead voices and the sounds 
they emit. It comes across as an act of reciting a poem, and they alternate, each one having 
been assigned a line. After a while, they finish off with a long silence which upsets them, as if 
they could both disappear if they do not follow up with something new to say: 
VLADIMIR: They make a noise like feathers. 
ESTRAGON: Like leaves. 
VLADIMIR: Like ashes. 
ESTRAGON: Like leaves. 
            Long silence. 
VLADIMIR: (in anguish). Say anything at all! (63). 
The performance of Not I as a whole is a great example of the interplay between silence and 
sound. It is a demonstration of the persistence of the rhetoric of the mind that gushes language 
incapable of having meaning or purpose. The brain forces the mouth to spew words in an 
attempt to keep a strong hold on existence, a self-referential act in the fullest sense. In the rest 
of the plays we have looked at, the characters must reinforce their presence through speech, 
being that they have no other excuse to be there. In the case of Mouth, the impetus to speak is 
even greater in that sense. One of the most important aspects and roles of any mouth is to 
speak, so Beckett makes Mouth fulfil this role completely. The moments of silence Mouth is 
allowed are, therefore, much shorter. In duration, they are the equivalent of a breath, just 
enough to keep the actress from suffocating on her own words. The stage elements being cut 
down to an absolute minimum, and the unconventional use of light as a single focused beam, 
force the observer to have a strong emotional reaction to the intensity and the tempo in which 
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this drama is played out in front of him. Once again, the process of the play itself is what we 
are made to observe. The birth of Mouth is her stage presence, and she, much like Winnie, 
pushes herself to the task: ''out ... into this world ... this world ... tiny little thing'' (405). The 
whole of the performance emits a sensation of the buzzing that Mouth keeps referring to, and 
is the manifestation of the brain struggling with itself. Our awareness of the beam of light is 
enhanced through reference: ''and all the time this ray or beam ... like moonbeam ... but 
probably not ... always the same spot'' (407). Mouth also comments on the scream before she 
executes it, marking the silence of the act of listening in the same way, and the following lines 
also seem to describe the exactness of the situation, regarding not only the stage, but the 
condition of the audience as well – complete silence of the inability of the audience or the 
Auditor to help her: ''no screaming for help for example ... should she feel so inclined ...  
scream ... [screams] ... then listen ... [silence] ... scream again ... [screams again] ... then listen 
again ... [silence] ... no ... spared that ... all silent as the grave ... no part – what? ... the buzzing 
... yes ... all silent but the buzzing'' (408). The words that come out of Mouth are ''now this 
stream ... steady stream'' (408), and she recites all of the components that make it possible: 
''the lips ... the cheeks ... the jaws ... the whole face ... all those – what? ... the tongue? ... yes 
... the tongue in the mouth ... all those contortions without which ... no speech possible'' (404). 
Her existence is currently only the mouth, no body, and she vocalizes that as well, along with 
the fact that she has ''no idea what she's saying ... imagine! ... no idea what she's saying!... and 
can't stop ... no stopping it'' (410). The examples go on, and it would be easier just to re-type 
the whole speech to get the point across. It makes one realize the reality of the difficulty 
Beckett had when asked about what do his plays mean. The steady stream of sounds that are 
coming out of Mouth are, simultaneously, the justification of her existence and the 
impossibility of them having any meaning whatsoever. Mouth is in the middle of telling, not 
re-telling. It is the ultimate realisation of a theatrical performance in the purest sense. 
 Next to the rhythm accomplished through the contrast of sound and silence, there is a 
certain hollowness pertaining to the structure of the plays which is their underpinning. It is a 
silence buried deep in each living thing, an acute awareness of the presence of an absolute 
absence of the creator that torments every being of Beckett's stage. In his speech, Lucky 
appropriately calls it the ''divine aphasia'' of a God that ''loves us dearly with some exceptions 
for reasons unknown'' (42). The condition of man is, therefore, to be condemned to the 
speechlessness of his own maker, to the intrinsic silence of his existence. The question of the 
existence of God becomes laughable, as in Not I, and life itself, as in Happy Days, a poor 
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joke. When Hamm insists that they pray in silence, silence is exactly what they get. From it, 
Hamm infers: ''The bastard! He doesn't exist!'' (38). The presences on stage are, therefore, 
deprived of any substance, and behind them we sense the presence of the author declaring his 
own emptiness in the awareness that creation is inherently silent.  
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6. Time, habit and memory 
For Beckett, time is the epitome of Tantalus's punishment, the ceaseless temptation 
without satisfaction, unleashed upon us through habit and memory. In Proust he calls it the 
''double-headed monster of damnation and salvation'' (1), and declares Proust's creatures to be 
the victims and prisoners of time. Much like for his own, there is no escape from the past nor 
the future. Beckett is greatly preoccupied with time in his plays and the passage of time is 
portrayed as both illusive and ominous, an unavoidable threat that is always present but is 
never realised. Time is looked upon as something that needs to be spent, the very act of its 
passing forgotten and, therefore, quickened. At the same time it is something that is in endless 
supply and, because of these traits, a source of great contradiction. Ultimately, of course, the 
problems arise out of the way in which we perceive time and the relationship we attain with 
the many versions of ourselves that have come about though the course of time. Because time 
never acts directly on the subject, but constantly modifies his personality, ''whose permanent 
reality, if any, can only be apprehended as a retrospective hypothesis'' (P, 4), the mechanism 
of time eludes the subject and, paradoxically, it simultaneously keeps the subject in captivity. 
But it is our personalized outlook on what  has transpired until now that keeps us from reality, 
because yesterday was assimilated into ''the only world that has reality and significance, the 
world of our own latent consciousness, and its cosmography has suffered a dislocation.'' (3). 
Looking at the world through our self-afflicted prism, we devise and project habitual patterns 
of behaviour that keep us safe from reality, tucked away in a familiar place where we 
maintain the illusion of having control over the future. However, as Didi says, ''habit is a great 
deadener'' (91). Beckett calls it ''the ballast that chains the dog to his vomit.'' (P, 8), and we 
see the functioning of its destructive routine in many little obsessions that the characters hold 
on to. In Endgame, as Hamm is being pushed closer to the window, he remembers the 
excitement of the moments ''in the beginning'', but then he lapses back to the drudgery that is 
the present: ''Do you remember, in the beginning, when you took me for a turn? You used to 
hold the chair too high. At every step you nearly tipped me out. [With senile quaver.] Ah, 
great fun, we had, the two of us, great fun! [Gloomily.] And then we got into the way of it.'' 
(42). 
Beckett's plays are infused with these questions and are an attempt at impersonating the way 
in which the sense of the passage of time operates inside consciousness. The abundant 
rhetorical contradictions we find in the dialogues and speeches of the characters, as well as 
the recursiveness of certain gestures or statements, exemplify the paradoxical influence of 
26 
 
time itself. Nothing truly exists but the present moment, but its existence is an abstraction of 
the mind and it cannot be tamed. Yesterday is, as Beckett states, a calamitous yesterday, but 
not in content (3). It is, rather, dangerous in the sense that it provides us with the opportunity 
to remember the subject that we were, but are not any more. Therefore it robs us of the 
attainment of the object of our desire, because the subject of today does not desire that which 
the subject of yesterday has, and we are ''disappointed at the nullity of what we are pleased to 
call attainment.'' (3). It is then a disconcerting existence, a ''World without end'' (H, 10), in 
which we experience either the boredom of living or the suffering of being, an existence in 
which we can never be up to speed with our desire: 
HAMM: Yesterday! What does that mean? Yesterday! 
CLOV: [Violently.] That means that bloody awful day, long ago, before this bloody  
  awful day. (32). 
 In that sense, progress and attainment are impossible, and there is nothing else to be done but 
to keep one self occupied with the banalities of the currently available that water down, even 
if it is just for a brief moment, the horror of perpetuity.  
 Even though they are aware of their condition of being trapped on stage, Beckett's 
characters have an obsession with resolution and ending. Their consciousness is tortured by 
eternity, so they crave for their awareness to be exempt from it. But the pain never stops. In 
Endgame, Hamm bids Clov to tell him whether it is time for his pain-killer five times. Clov 
responds with  a 'yes' only the fifth but, alas, ''there's no more pain-killer.'' (46). It is never 
time for the pain-killer. The pain of the passing of time cannot be soothed. The ringing of the 
alarm clock mimics the continuity and consistency of the bleak, flat line of an unchanging 
existence. They listen attentively, and Clov's reaction is symptomatic of his desire: ''The end 
is terrific!'' (34). Clov dreams of a world where everything would be, finally and completely, 
finished. The inconceivable notion of a life progressing in an everlasting standstill amplifies 
in him the feeling of anxiety. Hamm dispenses with this ludicrous idea of order, but for Clov 
it seems soothing and peaceful. ''I love order. It's my dream. A world where all would be 
silent and still and each thing in its last place, under the last dust.'' (39). The on-stage 
existence of the characters transpires through their constant questioning of the matter at hand, 
namely, the fact that they were assigned to each other, just like Hamm's ''Accursed 
progenitor'' (15) was to him, and they always come to the same conclusion: 
CLOV: So you all want me to leave you. 
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HAMM: Naturally. 
CLOV: Then I'll leave you. 
HAMM: You can't leave us. 
CLOV: Then I shan't leave you. (29). 
The paradoxical reasoning is recurrent and distinctive of the condition of the characters. Just 
like in Happy Days or Waiting for Godot, in Endgame we witness Beckett's people as being 
both agreeable and abusive. They care for each other and sometimes exhibit true affection, but 
despite their absolute interdependence, they do not recoil to batter and bully each other. They 
could commit the most unfathomable atrocities or show to be capable of the most beautiful 
acts of kindness. It would not make any difference to their condition of living in the sin of 
birth. In Proust, Beckett explains clearly the nature of this affliction of life that stands outside 
any assumed boundaries a human mind could conceive:  
Tragedy is not concerned with human justice. Tragedy is the statement of 
expiation, but not the miserable expiation of a codified breach of a local 
arrangement, organised by the knaves for the tools. The tragic figure represents 
the expiation of original sin, of the original and eternal sin of him and all his 'soci 
malorum', the sin of having been born. (49).  
The circularity of existence guarantees its own consistency through its inescapable and 
irrefutable, utterly paradoxical logic. As Hamm concludes: ''The end is the beginning and yet 
you go on.'' (45).  
In Happy Days, Winnie stumbles upon the same problem – the inability to act. She puts it 
down to the human condition. It is ''Human nature'' (18) and ''Human weakness'' (19) which is 
natural. Winnie's thought process and, by extension, her existence, is restricted to operate in 
between two soundings of the bell. She has no will of her own, just as Vladimir knows that 
''One isn't master of one's moods.'' (59), and she can do only as instructed. She pleads Willie 
to bid her put the parasol down and promises to obey. She incorporates in her character the 
subject of the actress aware of her theatrical performance and knows that this performance 
must always reveal itself just as it is. It must always be the same as the ones before and the 
ones after, perfectly consistent and unaltering, and every yesterday the same as today. 
Language is incapable of expressing the truth of a condition, and as is always the case with 
Beckett's plays, the words that she utters can only be useful as a mere running commentary or 
a side effect of an on-stage presence: 
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I speak of temperate times and torrid times, they are empty words. (Pause.) I 
speak of when I was not yet caught – in this way – and had my legs and had the 
use of my legs, and could seek out a shady place, like you, when I was tired of the 
sun, or a sunny place when I was tired of the shade, like you, and they are all 
empty words. (Pause.) It is no hotter today than yesterday, it will be no hotter 
tomorrow than today, how could it, and so on back into the far past, forward into 
the far future. (Pause.) And should one day the earth cover my breasts, then I shall 
never have seen my breasts, no one ever seen my breasts. (29-30).  
No past or future reference can be made to aid the setup of the now. The moment we try to 
address the present moment, it morphs into a fallacy of our subjective thought. Nothing can 
be said to be real. It can only be experienced once, and the truth of it can never be spoken of 
again. Change is impossible and each and every fleeting moment can only underline the 
previous. Alec Reid points out that Beckett's ''people'' 
exist and can exist only for as long as the play lasts, indeed only for as long as 
they are before our eyes. Beckett gives us no hint as to how they have come to the 
situation in which we find them. They have no past except for what they may tell 
us, and no future. (33). 
The sensation of progress and change is, therefore, illusory. Winnie's awkward physical 
position is there to underline that idea. The play keeps unravelling, objects are used, lips move 
and sounds come out – ''something seems to have occurred, something has seemed to occur, 
and nothing has occurred, nothing at all'' (30). The ''something seems to have occurred – 
nothing has occurred'' effect of Happy Days might be considered analogous to Clov's 
statement ''Something is taking its course''. But nothing has happened except for the truth and 
the fact of the actors presence on stage. A true theatrical experience is revealed in front of the 
viewer when Hamm, asked about what is the matter with him today, rightfully announces: 
''I'm taking my course.'' (31).  
 The rhetorical means which Beckett's people use to desperately implore the attention 
of the other are characterized by the same uncertainty and, at the same time, the frustration 
with which they approach the validity of their maker. Since they have no way of affirming 
their own existence, they turn to their fellow stage-dwellers to justify their presence. This 
brings us to the similarity between the yearning for the other and the yearning for the full 
integration of one's personality at any point in time. However, the other can never offer 
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enough attention for the thirst to be quenched, nor can the subject integrate its many versions 
created through the passing of time into a complete and absolute being attuned with all of the 
objects desired up to the present. Paradoxically, and ironically, the subject pushes the object 
away by virtue of his desire. Beckett sees this process occurring as a result of infectious 
mobility: 
Exemption from intrinsic flux in a given object does not change the fact that it is 
the correlative of a subject that does not enjoy such immunity. The observer 
infects the observed with his own mobility. Moreover, when it is a case of human 
intercourse, we are faced by the problem of an object whose mobility is not 
merely function of the subject's, but independent and personal : two separate and 
immanent dynamisms related by no system of synchronisation. So that whatever 
the object, our thirst for possession is, by definition, insatiable. (P, 6-7). 
Perhaps, then, it is not coincidental that, as she attempts to navigate Willie towards his hole, 
Winnie exclaims: ''What a curse, mobility!'' (35). At that moment Willie is the embodiment of 
her desire moving out of her sight. The mobility of the object is propelled by her own 
mobility as subject, as she vocalizes her desire but immediately disavows its possibility: ''Or 
just now and then, come round this side just every now and then and let me feast on you. 
(Back front.) But you can't, I know. (Head down.) I know.'' (35).  
 The difficulty of remembering is a trait inherent in all of Beckett's characters. It is an 
attribute that sometimes causes in them a great deal of frustration and a feeling that their mind 
is slowly dwindling. When speaking of the erosive power of art, Lawrence E. Harvey says 
that the ''frequent memory failures of the various characters break the continuity of linear 
time, to which modern Western society is so accustomed.'' (145). In that sense, stepping out of  
the conventional perception of linear time can be threatening. However, not being able to 
remember seems to be a kind of protective mechanism that encourages their focus toward the 
future, in order to keep their sanity to a certain degree, or keeps the focus in the present, in 
which case it is soothing for them, as long as they are preoccupied. The world of Beckett's 
plays is a true realisation of a quantum universe of infinite possibilities in store for any 
particular subject or object. The prerequisite for this is that future events must not be strictly 
defined nor sealed. Beckett explains that the ''future event cannot be focussed, its implication 
cannot be seized, until it is definitely situated and a date assigned to it.'' (P, 6). Any temporal 
specification of a particular future event tears down the security that we had in our ignorance 
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and we begin to perceive the future as threatening. The plays, therefore, maintain a very 
general, nebulous idea of both the past and the future. This provides for action without 
purpose, a mindless perseverance in pushing forward. No day is different from any other, but 
the will to keep on going is strong in Beckett’s people, and it can be expressed, as Jean-
Jacques Mayoux points out, in a single word: '' 'On!', surely, thus situated, the most dramatic 
word in the play, and which sums up the heroic absurdity of mankind.'' (31).  
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7. Caught off guard 
Finally, it is important to say something about the dramatic effect that is achieved 
through the subtle and unconscious dynamic between the plays and the audience. As much as 
Beckett's people are turned inward and seem completely private and closed off for anything 
that is not their familiar realm, they are also strongly connected to the audience, as should be 
the case with any true drama. However, in Beckett's case we do not necessarily pick up on 
that connection right away. We feel, rather, like something has slipped through the back door 
of our mind, an idea that starts growing and a feeling that builds up as the play progresses. 
Nevertheless, a kind of dialogue is established and it leaves a potent and deep impression on 
the viewer. We are persuaded to feel more strongly the condition we see on stage, and we can 
do that only by accessing it in ourselves. However, the dialogues and the events that take 
place in front of us do not make much sense. Words are empty, phrases are turned on their 
head, and each sentence contradicts the previous one. Everything is made empty and hollow. 
Yet we feel we are engaged and mesmerized by the performance. The result of the plays is a 
rhetorical feat of persuasion, an extremely communicative and outgoing system that makes us 
aware of that deep place of emptiness and silence in ourselves, where there is no meaning and 
logic and there is no lack of void. But, in order to mimic that sense through a theatrical 
performance, Beckett had to take drastically anti-rhetorical measures, in the sense that he 
stripped meaning in language down to its bare minimum and included endless digressions, 
contradictions and misunderstandings to demonstrate the inability to express the 
inexpressible. John Pilling makes an interesting point on this subject: 
The most obvious reason why Beckett reverted to English in 1956, and has 
continued, with very few exceptions, to write his drama in English first, is that he 
found himself, in Fin de partie, composing a French whose richness ran counter 
to his real interest in the poverty of language as a medium of communication. 
(69).    
As language is unable to express, but still used, it must be reduced and self-referential, rather 
than symbolic. This draws the consciousness of the observer closer to the events on stage, 
narrows the view and concentrates the experience.                                                                                                     
By an apparently wanton sacrifice of colour, movement and change – three of the 
dramatist's major assets – Beckett achieves a fantastic degree of concentration 
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inducing a heightened awareness – the very essence of the dramatic experience. 
(Reid, 37).  
The self-reference of the play points directly to the author, and as the audience unconsciously 
senses this, a connection is established that is analogous to the one between the presences on 
stage. As Shimon Levy explains, ''The play and the actors mediate between the self-
consciousness of the playwright and the ''other'' self-consciousness of and in his audience.'' 
(133). It is a subtle but constant change of pace that keeps recurring throughout the plays. The 
characters invariably transition from one mode of thought or consciousness to the next and 
back again. They seem to lapse into a speculative mode of being which is immediately 
replaced by the inherently trivial and every-day issues of living. We find them consistent in 
inconsistency and, inevitably, emotionally concentrate on this variation, while another 
dynamism plays out on a more deeper level of our understanding. As observers, we seem to 
be addressed by statements which involve the very process of our observation. Winnie, for 
example says: ''Someone is looking at me still'' (37), and Didi, much in the same way, 
concludes: ''At me too someone is looking, of me too someone is saying, He is sleeping, he 
knows nothing, let him sleep on.'' (91). We pick up on these statements as meaningful mostly 
because they ''involve our sense of being'' (Duckworth, 69). We have no choice but to 
internalize the process we are observing, but we need not be aware of this infiltration. 
Actually, we should not be, if the process is to fulfil itself in the first place. As the people on 
stage are concerned with creating endless distractions for themselves, we as spectators are the 
ones who, unconsciously, also replicate a kind of distraction in ourselves. Duckworth explains 
this in terms of Freud's emphasis on the nuance of the process: 
 Freud has postulated that for the spectator to feel that he is the victim of the same 
conflict as the hero, the neurotic impulse must be so indefinite that 'the process of 
reaching consciousness goes on in turn within the spectator while his attention is 
distracted and he is in the grip of his emotions, rather than capable of rational 
judgment'. (69).  
Therefore, the only drama that can take place is not actualized on stage, but within us. We are 
the ones that ascribe our personal understanding to the matter at hand and can access the void 
in us, through the observation of the relentless insistence of void on stage. Beckett 
intentionally makes an extremely general and senseless drama, a pointless and absurd gesture 
that is really the only kind that could create an opposite effect in the spectator just through the 
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inherent functioning of his consciousness. In other words, we are presented with a blank 
canvas, but not necessarily with the purpose of filling it in, but recognizing the same inner 
area of blankness in us. All of the problems and turmoil of the stage are of our own making, 
and we are invited to fill in these gaps because of the way in which the plays are structured – 
as areas of nothingness that threaten to stretch their influence, but can do that only through the 
mechanism of implosion on private levels of existence of the author, of the character, and 
finally, of the observer. This effect that the plays achieve is also the reason why we tend to 
feel as if we have established some kind of deeper connection with the author or the 
characters. But it is not something we establish with the medium or some other consciousness. 
It is solely the connection we establish with ourselves. It we give into the blunder of 
allegorical or symbolical interpretation, we forget that we are observing drama that is 
completely without meaning, that rejects to be assigned meaning at every step of the way. 
Therefore it causes us to see more clearly our own meaninglessness. As Reid says: ''The 
author is presenting an experience not an argument, truth not statement, and we must respond 
each in our own terms.'' (30).  
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8. Conclusion 
 
 I have come to know from personal experience that most people, when faced with the 
question of what they think about Beckett's plays, usually feel discomfort at the memory or 
thought of witnessing such an experience. However, those who have found the patience for a 
performance may have found themselves entranced by its melodious flow of thought that 
comes with the breaking loose from convention and logic. By repeating and exaggerating on 
stage all of the 'great deadeners' out of which man makes his ball and chain, Beckett seems to 
shake us into realizing the effects of these punishments which we have created in our own 
lives. His persuasive rhetoric is, then, focused upon letting us know this through experience 
and not through words. He makes the light on stage point to itself, the characters to talk about 
themselves, the props on stage to be exactly what they are, he erases all reference but self-
reference, and we find ourselves in a position in which we inevitably must point to ourselves 
as well. The awareness of the emptiness in front us becomes the awareness of the emptiness 
in us, but this void that fills the experience proves to be extremely liberating as we come to 
realize the nullity of the countless intricacies of our engagements, regulations, commitments 
and entanglements that make up the gruelling social niceties of our day to day existence. 
Beckett's plays always present us with the truth because they are created through the very 
process of the play unravelling before us. Lois Gordon makes an interesting observation 
regarding this subject. She compares Beckett's plays to the paintings of the French 
Impressionists because of the way in which we can see the process of making the painting just 
by observing the painting itself: ''Fixing and stabilizing the image was impossible because 
only process could be captured.'' (115). This is what Beckett's characters show us – the 
inability of fixing in our minds the image of ourselves, the impossibility of attainment and the 
unavoidable and perpetual epistemological uncertainty that comes with it.  Beckett makes us 
realize we are all equal in the face of life, and, as we see from Sastre’s interesting insight, the 
performance, in a way, places a mirror in front of us: 
He destroys their external differences. He rubs out the huge eyebrow. Takes off 
the big nose. Erases the bright colors. Washes off the make-up, so that the true 
sunken eyes appear. He throws the pair into the circus ring. They are flung down. 
They wait. They get bored. They play. We laugh, but our laughter rings hollow. 
What has happened? We have recognized ourselves. (103). 
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